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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the time allocation of Italian spouses to paid work, childcare and household 
work. The literature suggests that Italian husbands contribute the least to unpaid household work, 
relative to other European countries, while Italian women have the lowest market employment 
rates. We model the three different time uses simultaneously for the two spouses within each 
household, allowing for corner solutions and correlations in the unobservables across the system of 
six equations. To estimate the model we use data drawn from the 2002-03 Italian Time Use Survey, 
combined with earnings information taken from the 2002 Bank of Italy Survey. We conclude that 
Italian husbands’ time allocation responds to their wife’s attributes: in particular, husbands’ 
housework time increases with the wage of their wife. On the contrary, the own wage effect is 
significantly negative for housework of women.  Childcare time of fathers increases with own wage 
and with the presence of small children and this is true both for weekdays and weekends. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a scant, though growing, economic theory literature on the time allocation of spouses 
within the same household. The theoretical facts are set up by the pioneering work of Becker (1965) 
and Gronau (1976) that allow individuals to trade off domestic work, market work and leisure. A 
step further is taken by Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) that allow for more disaggregation of 
domestic work into many non-market activities.  More recently, Apps and Rees (1997, 2002) 
develop a household model that incorporates household production and childcare time.  Apps 
(2003) shows that ignoring the time individuals allocate to non-market work will bias the 
conventional estimates of the labour supply elasticity.   Chiappori (1997) allows for home 
production in the collective model of household behaviour.  Empirical work that investigates the 
time allocation of spouses within the same household is also growing, although the bulk of the 
applied literature consists of descriptive studies that analyze the time allocation of (married) men 
and women disjoint from each other.   
 
In this paper, we focus on the time allocation decision of Italian spouses. According to international 
comparisons, Italian men carry out less unpaid household work than men in most other OECD 
countries, being second only to Japanese men (OECD, 2001).  Burda, Hamermesh and Weil (2006 
and 2007) argue that men and women do the same amount of “total” work, defined as the sum of 
market and non-market work, in all European countries but Italy, where men are shown to work 
substantially less than women.  In Table 1, we show the average time allocated to different activities 
by men and women in a number of European countries, according to the Harmonized European 
Time Use Survey (HETUS).1  Italian men are indeed found to perform the lowest amount of 
domestic work among men in the countries considered, second to Spaniards. Instead, Italian women 
stand out as the least active in the labour market, close to German women.   
 
Some specific characteristics of the labour market situation of Italian women are also worth 
mentioning:  they enjoy one of the lower gender-wage differentials among OECD countries but 
their employment rates are also exceptionally low (see Table A.1 in the Appendix).      Olivetti and 
Petrongolo (2008) argue that the gender wage gap should be adjusted for selection into 
                                                          
1
 The table is taken from the online information on HETUS provided at https://www.testh2.scb.se/tus/tus/.  Each 
national statistical institute is responsible for the accuracy of data they have contributed to the database. Statistics 
Finland is responsible for setting up and harmonizing the database. Statistics Sweden has built and runs the table 
generating tool. The contributing National Statistical Institutes have approved the technique by which the estimates are 
calculated by the tool. 
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employment: without this adjustment for selection into employment the male-female gender-wage 
differential is underestimated.  The low employment rates of Italian women are partly explained by 
institutional factors (Del Boca and Wetzel, 2007; Del Boca et al., 2007, 2008). 
 
To our knowledge, there are surprisingly few studies of the time allocation of Italian spouses. 
Mencarini and Tanturri (2004) analyze the time allocation of Italian spouses in conjunction with the 
arrival of a new-born child, in different types of households, using data from a special time use 
survey carried out in 5 big towns located in the North, the Centre and the South of Italy (Florence, 
Messina, Padua, Pesaro and Udine). The authors concluded that market time of men increased 
following the birth of a child while their childcare time was almost unaffected. Anxo et al. (2007) 
carry out a comparative analysis of how individuals allocate their time to market work, non-market 
work (that includes childcare) and leisure over their life cycle in a number of countries, including 
Italy.  In particular, they find that Italian women tend to specialize in household production more 
than women in other countries and that the time they allocate to housework increases dramatically 
with the birth of a new child and the presence of small children.  
 
It is our aim to estimate the impact of economic incentives on Italian spouses’ time allocation 
decisions. In particular, we focus in this study on wage effects. Wages can be affected by policies 
such as minimum wage laws, equal opportunity legislation, and income taxation.  The expected 
effects of wages on market labour supply are known.  The literature on the wage elasticity of unpaid 
household work is less well developed and there is no clear indication on the expected signs of the 
wage elasticities (see, Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2008, for a discussion).   
 
In this paper, we model simultaneously the decision of spouses to allocate time between market 
work and non-market time, distinguishing three time uses: paid work, childcare and housework.  
This approach has the advantage of not aggregating child-caring time and housework, thus allowing 
these time allocations to be valued differently by spouses and to be affected differently by a number 
of factors, like the spouses’ wage rates, their education, the presence and age of children.  
According to the theory, the impact of economic incentives on child-caring and housework may 
well differ (Apps and Rees, 2002; Connelly and Kimmel, 2007a, Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2008).  
To our knowledge, there are very few studies that modeled childcare and housework separately and 
most authors aggregate these two time uses. Hersh and Stratton (1994), for example, study the 
relation between housework and wages of American spouses. They conclude that housework 
contributes to lower women’s wages, thus reinforcing their specialization into housework relative to 
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their husband. Kalenkoski, Ribar and Stratton (2008) analyze the influence of wages on childcare 
time and paid work of spouses in the United Kingdom, concluding that while women's time 
allocation to paid work and childcare responds to own and cross (spouse's) wage, that of men is not 
responsive to own wage.  Kalenkoski, Ribar and Stratton (2005 and 2006) compare the amounts of 
childcare and market work performed by parents in different types of households, distinguishing 
between primary and secondary childcare.  Connelly and Kimmel (2007b) investigate spousal 
leisure, home production and childcare and the impact of wages.  All these studies allow wages to 
affect spousal time allocation by instrumenting or predicting wages -which is what we do also in 
this paper, due to data limitations (see later). A different approach is taken by Bloemen and 
Stancanelli (2008) that model simultaneously wage rates, employment, and time allocation of 
French spouses within each household, distinguishing three main time uses: paid work, childcare 
and household chores, and allowing for corner solutions and various correlations across the errors 
of the ten equations system. The authors find that husband’s childcare and housework time responds 
to their wife’s wage rate and that more educated parents spend more time with their children.    
 
For our empirical analysis we use data drawn from the national time use survey 2002-03 Indagine 
Multiscopo sulle Famiglie – Uso del Tempo, carried out by the Italian National Statistical Office 
(ISTAT). The survey is representative of the Italian population. This survey contains socio-
demographic information on individuals and households and collects individual diaries either for a 
week-day or for a weekend day. This has the advantage of enabling us to analyze separately 
spouses’ time allocation during week-days and at weekends. At weekends, for example, husbands 
may be able to take over more of non-market work than they do during weekdays.  The main 
disadvantage of this dataset is that no information was collected on earnings or income. Therefore, 
we have drawn information on individual earnings from the 2002 Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW) carried out by the Bank of Italy to predict wages for individuals in the time-use 
survey sample.  
 
We find that market work of women responds significantly and positively to the own wage. Instead, 
the own wage effect of paid work of men is statistically insignificant. Interestingly, men are found 
to react positively to their wife’s wage: the higher the wage of the woman, the more domestic work 
is performed by her husband.  Instead, the cross wage effect is insignificant for women: the time she 
allocates to housework is not a function of her husband’s wage. Women are found to spend 
significantly less time on performing domestic tasks, the higher their own wage.  Childcare time of 
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fathers increases with the own wage and with the presence of small children and this is true both for 
weekdays and weekends. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 the econometric model is presented, while in 
Section 3 the data and sample selection criteria are illustrated. In Section 4 descriptive analysis is 
presented and the results of estimation of the model are discussed in Section 5.  Conclusions follow.  
 
3. The model  
 
We model simultaneously three different time uses -paid work, childcare and household work- for 
the two spouses within each household. We allow for corner solutions and correlations in 
unobservables across this system of six equations. Predicted wages are extrapolated from the 2002 
Bank of Italy Household Survey, as the time use survey does not collect any information on 
earnings or income.  
 
To set up the framework for the econometric model let us assume, that spouses (k = m for husbands 
and k = f for wives) in each household i maximize household welfare subject to a budget constraint 
and a time constraint. Individuals consume goods and services bought at the market, 
,,,
)( fmkC Mik = and home produced goods and services )(HiC . The market goods can be divided into 
private consumption goods pikC , housework services
hm
iC , and child care services
cm
iC . Thus we have 
),,()( cmihmipikMik CCCC = , with an associated vector of market prices p. Housework services and child 
care services can also be produced by the household members, and accordingly we denote 
),()( chihhiHi CCC = , with hhiC  home produced goods and housework services and chiC  child care  
provided by the parents. Thus, for instance, parents can buy child care at the market and can take 
care of their children themselves. Utility is derived from total consumption ),( )()( HiMikik CCC = , 
including market goods and home production, leisure time (lik) and the time allocated to children 
(ti1k) (see, for example, Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2008): 
fmktlCUU kiikikikik ,),,( 1 ==      (1) 
By including time spent with the children directly in the utility function, we make explicit that 
parents not only derive utility from the child care services but also enjoy the time spent with the 
children, comparable to leisure time. By including child care services in the utility function, we 
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express that the parents care about the ‘quality’ of the children. Child care services, though, can be 
both bought at the market and provided by the parents themselves.2 We define household welfare as 
a Pareto weighted average of the individual utility functions (1) of husband and wife, with Pareto 
weight ρ:3  
 
),,()1(),,(),,,,,( 1111 fiifififmiimimimifimfimiifim tlCUtlCUllttCCW ρρ −+=    (2) 
 
The budget constraint is a function of the wage rates of the two spouses (wim and wif), the time 
allocated to market work by each spouse (ti2k) and the total household non-labour income (µi). It 
balances the expenditures of goods bought at the market (superscript M) and the disposable 
household income: 
  
),,,,,( 22)()()( iifimfimiMifMimMi wwttpfpCpCpC µ=+=     (3) 
 
where p indicates the vector of prices of market goods and services. The production of home 
produced goods and services hhiC , excluding child care services, can be described with a production 
function4  
),( 33 fimihhhi ttgC =         (4) 
 
It describes the relation between housework time inputs ti3k of each spouse and the produced 
output.5 Like in Bloemen and Stancanelli (2008), we take as a reference a simplified theoretical 
framework, whereby it is assumed that spouses do not derive utility from spending time on 
housework  (see Gronau, 1976, for example): housework time ti3k , k = m, f, only enters the 
production function, and therefore it has a productive use only. Household members derive utility 
from the consumption of the home produced goods, but not from the time they spent on this 
activity. Alternatively, we assume that time spent with the children has both a consumptive use (it 
                                                          
2
 Although (some) child care services bought at the market and child care services provided by the parents may be close 
or even perfect substitutes, utility specification (1) is general enough to allow for different marginal utilities of market 
services and home produced services, thus allowing for a possible difference in ‘quality’ that the parents assign to them. 
3
 In bargaining models of household behaviour, the weights may depend on the individual wage rates. 
4
 We assume that the production function satisfies the usual regularity conditions, like positive and diminishing 
marginal productivity of input factors. 
5
 We have ignored heterogeneity of home productivity that arises when housework is performed at different times of the 
day, when the prices of substitute goods vary and when some home production may not have market substitutes. 
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enters utility function (1)) and a productive use: households may produce childcare services chiC  
using their time inputs ti1k according to a production function 
 
),( 11 fimicchi ttgC =        (5) 
 
The time constraint, say T = 24 hours a day, reads as follows: 
∑
=
+=
3
1j
ikijk ltT       (6) 
where ti3k denotes house work time. Here we have denoted with tijk , the time spent on activity j, 
with  j = 1, 2, 3 (time with children, time at work, and time for household work, respectively) by 
household member k, with k = m, f, in household i, with i = 1,..., N.  
 
The model describes the various trade-offs that couples consider in allocating their time between 
market income generating, domestic production and consumption uses. Spouses derive utility from 
leisure and time with the children (equation 1). House work and childcare services can be produced 
by the household members themselves, using their time inputs, as described by the production 
functions. Alternatively, they can be bought at the market. Buying goods at the market is costly 
(budget constraint, equation 3), whereas spending more time on household production diminishes 
the amount of time available for market work or leisure (time constraint, equation 6). Market work 
is the most important source of income for most households (budget constraint, equation 3). 
Moreover, time inputs of spouses in the household production processes (4) and (5) may 
complement or substitute each other.   
    
Solving the model for the time decisions of the spouses within each household, we get that the time 
spent on any given activity depends on the wage rates of the husband and wife wim and wif, and on 
household non-labour income and market prices. 
 
The theoretical model does not unequivocally predict the signs of the wage parameters for all time 
uses. For the own wage effects this is because there are opposing income and substitution effects. 
The extent to which the time inputs of spouses are complements or substitutes in household 
production determines the signs of the cross wage effects (see Bloemen and Stancanelli 2008 for a 
discussion).  
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In the empirical analysis, we disregard the price of market substitutes for home production, since 
they are not known.
  
The empirical model allows for heterogeneity in unobservables and 
correlations across the unobservables of the time use equations of the two spouses. Unobservables 
may capture differences in productivity and in the price of substitutes for home production. We do 
not observe household non-labour income and wages in the data. However, we have predicted 
wages using the Bank of Italy household survey (see the data section). The time use equations that 
we estimate are thus the following, where wˆ stands for predicted wages:6 
 
otherwiset
tiftt
Niandjxwwt
ijk
ijkijkijk
ijkjkikif
f
jkim
m
jkijk
0
0
,...,13,2,1'ˆlnˆln
**
*
=
>=
==+++= εβαα
   (4) 
 
where the xik are observed spouses’ characteristics and εik, unobservables.  Note that this system of 
equations allows zero time to be spent on a given activity.  Individuals, in fact, may spend no time 
on market work, housework, or childcare. We allow the errors of the six time use equations (three 
for each spouse) to be correlated with each other and define:  
 
)'( '' ijfijmi εεω =     with     ),0(~ ΣNiω        (5) 
 
where Σ  is the unrestricted variance-covariance matrix of dimension 6*6 of the errors of the six 
equations system. By letting the covariance matrix be unrestricted and estimating all of its elements, 
we allow for the simultaneity of spouses' time-allocation choices.  
 
Correlation in unobservables between the errors of the six time-use equations may arise from 
unobserved household-specific correlations in preferences (i.e. unobserved positive assortative 
matching effects) or productivity (someone who is productive in the labour market may also be 
productive in housework, or the opposite, if labour market attachment prevents individuals from 
accumulating housework experience) and, following the theoretical model, household-specific 
heterogeneity in market prices for housework and child care services.   
 
                                                          
6
 With the Bank of Italy household survey we simultaneously estimated a (log)-wage equation with an employment 
equation with maximum likelihood, assuming that errors follow a multivariate normal distribution. Thus, the estimates 
of the wage equation have been corrected for selectivity. To predict wages for the Italian time use survey, we used the 
values of the covariates in the time use survey and the coefficients of the wage equation. 
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The complete model now consists therefore of the six time-use equations in (4) and the joint density 
of the errors in (5). We can then construct the likelihood contribution for each type of observation. 
To deal with the multidimensionality of the model, we employ simulated maximum-likelihood 
estimation, using the GHK algorithm (see, for instance, Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou, 1993).7 
Standard errors are corrected for the use of parameter estimates of the wage regression in the 
prediction of wages.  
 
 
4. The data 
 
We investigate the time allocation of Italian spouses using data drawn from the national time use 
survey 2002-03, “Indagine Multiscopo sulle Famiglie – Uso del Tempo”, carried out by the Italian 
National Statistical Office (ISTAT).  The dataset covers 21,075 households, corresponding to 
55,773 individuals, including children and other adults living in the household. An individual 
questionnaire containing socio-demographic information and a time diary were collected. In each 
municipality covered by the survey, households were allocated to three groups and each group was 
asked to fill in the daily diary at a different time: the first group on a week day different from 
Saturday or Sunday, the second group on a Saturday, and the third group on a Sunday.  The over 
sampling of weekend diaries was a deliberate choice of the data collector (ISTAT).   
 
This dataset has therefore the advantage of being a representative survey of the Italian population 
and the advantage that all household members were required to fill in a time diary, so that both the 
husband and the wife within each household in our sample have filled in a diary.  
On the other hand, the main disadvantage of this dataset is that no information was collected on 
earnings or income. Therefore, we have drawn information on individual earnings from the 2002 
Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) to predict and impute wages for the  
individuals in our time-use survey sample (see Section 4.3) 
 
                                                          
7
 We use 60 replications in the simulation of the likelihood function. 
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4.1 Sample selection 
For our empirical analysis we selected a sample of married couples, in which both spouses are older 
than 18 and younger than 61 years at the time of the interview and have at least one child younger 
than 19. We excluded couples in which one (or both) spouses is self-employed, in full-time 
education, retired, disable, or doing the military service. We also excluded couples for which the 
weekly diary was filled in on a “special” day, like, for example, a vacation day or a sickness day.  
 
Childless couples were dropped as one of the focuses of the paper is distinguishing childcare time 
from household production tasks and paid work. Cohabiting couples were dropped as there were too 
few observations on them.8 The final sample for the analysis consists of 2,929 couple households.  
We distinguish couples where both spouses answered the diary on a week day (1,049 couples), from 
those that filled the diary on weekend day (1,784 couples).  
 
4.2 Variables used 
The diary collects information on the time spent on a large number of tasks. Activities are coded by 
the respondent as main or secondary activities. For example, someone maybe cooking and watching 
television or cooking and watching the children. It is the respondent that chooses how to code 
activities into main or secondary ones. We distinguish here the following activities: 
- market work; 
- caring for children, which includes also playing with the children and transport time to take 
them somewhere; 
- total time caring for children, including childcare activities as above reported also as 
secondary activity housework, including cleaning the house, shopping, cooking, doing the 
laundry, washing up dishes, doing paperwork. 
 
We have computed the total time spent caring for children adding together the time reported under 
this heading as main activity and secondary activity. To fully grasp the total amount of time spent 
caring for children it is important to take into account also secondary activities.  
 
As far as the other covariates go, we use intermediary education level, equivalent to 8 years of 
schooling (5 years of primary school and 3 years of intermediary schooling) as the reference group. 
                                                          
8
 For the sample that answered the diary at week days, there were only 33 unmarried couples. 
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A separate dummy variable captures the impact of lower than intermediary education (primary 
education or less).  The other education levels that can be distinguished are lower ‘secondary 
education’ (for individuals with 2 years of secondary schooling); upper secondary education (5 
years of secondary schooling); a short university degree (2 years); and a standard university degree 
(4 or more years). These last two categories are aggregated together in the estimation of the model 
as there are few observations with a short University degree.  We also aggregate together all 
secondary schooling, i.e. lower and upper secondary schooling.    
 
Next, we used binary indicator variables for the age of the youngest child in the household. We 
distinguish two categories: the youngest child is (i) younger than 3 years; (ii) 3 up to 5 years old. 
The availability of childcare facilities for children below the age of 3 is very limited in Italy, 
especially in the Southern regions of the country (Del Boca et al., 2007 and 2008).  
 
We finally include a dummy variable “North” that captures the effect of residing in the Northern 
part of Italy (rather than the fact of coming from the North).  It may partially capture the effect of 
smaller unemployment rates.  
 
4.3 Wage imputation 
As already mentioned, information on wages was drawn from the 2002 Bank of Italy Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).  The survey is done every two years. The 2002 SHIW 
survey used here covers 8,011 households, and 22,148 individuals. The SHIW contains information 
on annual earnings (collected after taxes) and household non-labour income. Hours usually worked 
per week and months worked in the year are collected, from which hourly wages were constructed.  
For the estimation of the wage regressions, we selected a sample that includes individuals aged 18 
to 60 years, not retired, self-employed or in full-time education. The resulting sample contains 
4,853 women and 3,936 men. Among these, 2,266 women and 3,096 men report all information 
necessary to compute their wage rate.  
 
The 2002 SHIW sample used for the wage regressions and the time-use sample are fairly 
comparable (see Table A.2, in the Appendix), as reasonable since they are both drawn from 
representative national surveys.  The parameters of a wage equation and an employment equation 
were estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood (Heckman regression) to allow for 
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selectivity.  We used the selectivity corrected parameter estimates of the wage equation to predict 
wages for observations in the time use sample. For the wage estimates we excluded individuals in 
the top and bottom 3% of the hourly wage distribution. The regressors of the wage equation 
included education dummies and a quadratic expression in potential work experience.9 The 
employment equation included additionally the marital status dummy, the regional level of 
unemployment, a series of dummies for the age of the youngest child in the household10 and a 
control for the number of children.  We also included a dichotomous variable for the presence of 
other adults above 55 years old in the household, but it did not show up significant. Results of 
estimation of the Heckman’s regressions for men and women, using the SHIW sample are given in 
Table A.3, in the Appendix.  Table A.4, in the Appendix, compares actual and predicted hourly 
wages from the Bank of Italy Survey.  
 
5. Descriptive analysis  
 
Descriptive statistics of the sample used for the week-days diaries analysis are given in Table 2. The 
average age is 41 years for men and 38 for women. Around 40% of the sample has an intermediary 
education (8 years of schooling, corresponding to scuola media) while around 50% has a secondary 
education. Less than 10% has a University degree. Female potential hourly wage is much lower 
than male one. We also want to stress that while about 96% of the men are employed, only 48%  of 
women work in the market. The average number of children is 1.6, knowing that we have selected 
only couples with children. In 22% of the households considered the youngest child is below 3 
years of age, while in 17% the youngest child is between 3 and 5 years. The table also shows that 
men devote to market work an average number of minutes that is three times that of women. On the 
contrary, women devote on average eight times more time to housework than men and three times 
more to childcare.   
 
Comparable statistics for spouses that answered the time diary on a Saturday or a Sunday are 
provided in Table 3. It is shown that the time husbands allocate to household production and 
children increases at weekend days relative to week-days, while the opposite is  true for women.  
                                                          
9
 Potential experience was constructed, as usual, by subtracting schooling years from age, as the survey did not collect 
information on actual work experience.  Work experience of women is bound to be overestimated because of higher 
inactivity and unemployment rates for women than men in Italy and possible career breaks related to childbearing. 
10
 These dummy variables indicate if the youngest child is aged 0-2, 3-5, 6-13, 14-18. 
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Table 4 shows in more details the distribution of the time allocated by husband and wife to paid 
work, housework, and childcare, respectively, for week-days diaries; while Table 5 presents the 
share of the husband in the total time allocated to each activity by the couple.  Italian men spend on 
average 41 minutes a day on housework and 39 minutes caring for their children. The median 
values are much lower, and equal to ten minutes each. More than a quarter of the men in the sample 
did not perform any housework or childcare during the day the diary was collected. Over 50% of 
the women did not perform any paid work.   These findings are corroborated by the observation that 
men’s share in paid work is 100% at the median (Table 5). Husbands’ share in household work is 
less than 20%, while their share in childcare time is 23%. Looking at the descriptive statistics, it is 
difficult to say whether these results are explained by the low labour market participation rates of 
Italian women or by the low participation rate of Italian husband into non-market activities. The 
estimation of the econometric model will bring more insights into these issues, also allowing for the 
effect of own and cross-wages on spousal time allocation. 
 
Tables 6 provide the median time spent on each activity by the two spouses as a function of each 
spouse’s education level, for individuals that filled in the diary during a normal week-day. They 
suggest that highly educated women (with a University degree) spend more time on paid work and 
less time on domestic work than poorly educated women (with primary education or less). 
Childcare time increases, instead, with mothers’ education level.  Instead, men with an intermediary 
level of education (8 years or more but less than University), spend more time both on market work, 
and with their children. The higher the education level of their wife, the more time husbands 
allocate to domestic tasks and childcare; while the opposite is true for women, for which we 
observe that the higher the education of their husband, the lesser time they spend on domestic work 
and childcare. Time allocated to market work does not seem to vary much for men with different 
levels of education. 
6. Results of estimation 
 
Equations (4) and (5) present the results of estimation of the model described in Section 3. The 
model allows for the three different time uses -paid work, childcare and household work- for the 
two spouses within each household. It allows for corner solutions.  Correlations in unobservables 
across the system of six equations (three for each spouse) are left unrestricted and are estimated 
simultaneously. Predicted wages are drawn from the 2002 Bank of Italy SHIW dataset (see Section 
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4 for details). The estimated standard errors from the six equations are corrected using the standard 
errors of the Heckman’s regressions. As mentioned earlier on, economic theory does not 
unequivocally predict the signs of the wage elasticities of spousal non-market time. 
 
We have estimated different variants of the model. First, we have estimated the model as presented 
in equation (4), including predicted wage rates, for the sample of couples that filled in week-diaries 
(Table 7). Next, we have estimated a model variant without the predicted wages (Table 8). Finally, 
we have estimated the model for the couples that answered the time diary on a weekend day (Table 
9).  It may be that spouses exhibit different behaviour during weekend days, for instance, because 
husbands do more house work or childcare during the weekend and women do less (see Table 3).  
 
The results of estimation of the model for weekdays are shown in Table 7. We find that market 
work of women responds significantly and positively to own wage. The own wage effect of paid 
work of men is, on the contrary, statistically insignificant. Own market time does not depend on the 
wage of one’s spouse: cross-wage effects on paid work are insignificant for both husbands and 
wives. Overall paid work of husbands is not a function of any of the variables considered, 
suggesting that whatever their characteristics men will opt for participating full-time in the labour 
market. The insignificance of the regressors of paid work of men may also be explained by the fact 
that part-time jobs are still quite uncommon in Italy: the average working hours for Italian men 
were over 7 hours a day (see Table 2). Market work of women falls significantly with the number of 
children and the presence in the household of small children younger than 3 years.  It decreases 
significantly for low-educated women with less than intermediary education (less than eight years 
of education).  Residing in the North increases significantly women’s paid work time. This may 
reflect cultural effects, but also lower unemployment rates and more childcare services availability.   
 
Next, let us look at the results of the equation for non-market time.  Interestingly, men are found to 
react positively to their wife’s wage: the higher the wage of the woman, the more domestic work is 
performed by her husband. This confirms the findings of Bloemen and Stancanelli (2008) for 
French couples.  Instead, the cross wage effect is insignificant for women: the time allocated to 
house work is not a function of their husband’s wage. Women are found to spend significantly less 
time on performing domestic tasks, the higher their own wage. The own wage effect is also 
negative, but statistically insignificant, for men. The house work of women increases significantly 
with the number of children, while this in not true for husbands.  Men residing in the North of Italy 
spend significantly more time carrying out domestic tasks than men living in other parts of Italy, 
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while the opposite is true for their wives: living in the North reduces significantly the time women 
allocate to house work. Regional residence variation does not affect childcare time. Childcare time 
of fathers increases with the own wage and with the presence of small children, while childcare 
time of mothers is not sensitive to wage incentives, but it increases with both the number of children 
and the presence of small children.  
 
The separate coefficients of age and age squared do have small t-values and do not show up 
significantly. We computed the likelihood ratio test statistic to test whether the parameters of age 
squared in all the six model equations are zero. For this purpose, we have estimated a model variant 
that excluded age squared. The null hypothesis could not be rejected (LR is 7.05 with 6 degrees of 
freedom). In the model variant without squared ages (not shown here) some of the age coefficients 
show up significantly. In particularly we find that the child care time of both spouses decreases with 
their age, while the housework time of the wife increases with age. The latter may represent a 
cohort effect. When re-estimating the model without wages (Table 8) we also find some significant 
age coefficients.  
 
The estimates of the impact of education on time allocation become more precise when we drop 
wages from the model (see Table 8). In particular, we find that higher educated women perform 
significantly more market work and lower educated women significantly less, with respect to the 
reference category (intermediary level of education). Higher educated women perform significantly 
less domestic work while men with secondary education more. Older and lesser educated fathers are 
now found to spend significantly less time with their children, while men with secondary education 
allocate more time to childcare. The other results are qualitatively comparable.  
 
Results of estimation of the model for couples that answered the diary on a Saturday or a Sunday 
(see Table 9) should be interpreted keeping in mind that people are less likely to perform market 
work on a weekend day.  Interestingly, lower educated men spend significantly more time on 
domestic tasks at weekend days.  The number of children increases the market hours worked by 
men in the weekend.  For couples residing in the North of Italy, husbands are less likely to do any 
market work at weekends, while wives are slightly more likely.  The cross-wage effect on 
housework of men is significantly positive: the higher the wage of their wife, the more domestic 
work is performed by men at the weekend.  This corroborates the finding of a significantly positive 
cross-wage effect for household production of men during weekdays.  Like for week-days diaries 
parental childcare increases with the number of children and the presence of small children. Instead, 
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the presence of young children affects negatively mothers’ housework time, suggesting that young 
children increase mothers’ childcare time at the expenses of domestic tasks. 
The correlations in the unobservables of the six time use equations are generally statistically 
significant for all the specifications considered (see Tables A.5, A.6, A.7 in the Appendix).  Instead, 
the correlation across the unobservables of the wife’s childcare and the unobservables of her 
domestic work is not significant. We also find an insignificant correlation across the unobservables 
of the housework equation of men and the paid work and childcare equations of women, for the 
case of weekend diaries (Table A.7).  Interestingly, the unobservables of housework of husband and 
wife are significantly and negatively correlated during week days but positively correlated over the 
weekend, which seems very reasonable. The correlation in the errors of the childcare equations of 
the two spouses is significantly positive for any of the specifications considered.  The same holds 
true for the paid work of the two spouses. The unobservables of own paid work time and own 
housework time are negatively correlated for either spouse, and for each of the three specifications. 
This indicates that individuals that perform more market work will perform less domestic work. The 
same holds true for the correlation between the errors of own market time and own childcare time 
which is also significantly negative for either spouse and for all specifications.  
 
Table 10 illustrates the wage elasticities for the main model of Table 7.  The elasticities were 
computed by increasing wages by one per cent and calculating the responses of own and cross time 
allocations at the mean values of the explanatory variables.  We have also computed the wage 
elasticity of the total time spent by husband and wife to, respectively, paid work, domestic tasks and 
childcare. 
 
We conclude that market time of wives would increase by 3.8% in response to a 1% increase in 
own wage. The opportunity cost of Italian women’s time may be particularly high due the lack of 
services that help women to reconcile work and family responsibilities. Housework of men would 
increase, at the mean, by less than one per cent (0.8%) if their wife’s wage increased by 1%. 
Housework of women would fall by 1.3% in response to an own wage increase of 1%. It follows 
indeed that total housework performed by either husband or wife within each couple would on 
average fall by 1% in response to an increase of 1% in the wage of the wife. Interestingly, childcare 
time of men would increase, at the mean, by 2.4% if their own wage increased by 1%. This would 
result in an increase of almost one per cent (0.9%) in the total childcare carried out at the household 
level.  
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6. Conclusions  
 
This paper is focused on the time allocation decision of Italian spouses. According to international 
comparisons, Italian men carry out, on average, less unpaid household work than men in most other 
OECD countries, being second only to Japanese men. According to the Harmonized European Time 
Use Survey (HETUS), Italian men perform the lowest amount of domestic work among men in the 
countries considered, while Italian women stand out as the least active in the labour market.  
 
We have investigated the impact of economic incentives on Italian spouses’ time allocation 
decisions. We have modelled simultaneously the decision of spouses to allocate time between 
market work and non-market time, distinguishing three time uses: paid work, childcare and house 
work.  This approach has the advantage of not aggregating child-care time and house work, thus 
allowing these time allocation decisions to be valued differently by the spouses. We have allowed 
for corner solutions, and correlations in unobservables across the system of six equations.  This has 
enabled us to estimate the impact of spousal and household characteristics on time allocation 
decisions made by husbands and wives and their interactions.   The model was estimated using data 
drawn from the national time use survey 2002-03, carried out by the Italian National Statistical 
Office (ISTAT). We have drawn information on individual earnings from the 2002 Bank of Italy 
Household Survey, to predict wages for individuals in the time-use survey sample.  
 
We have concluded that market work of women responds significantly and positively to own wage. 
Instead, the own wage effect of paid work of men is statistically insignificant. Cross-wage effects 
on paid work are insignificant for both husbands and wives. Interestingly, men are found to react 
positively to their wife’s wage: the higher the wage of the woman, the more domestic work is 
performed by her husband. Instead, the cross wage effect is insignificant for women: the time she 
allocates to housework is not a function of her husband’s wage. Women are found to spend 
significantly less time on performing domestic tasks, the higher their own wage. The own wage 
effect of housework is also negative but statistically insignificant for men. The housework of 
women increases significantly with the number of children, while this variable has no impact for 
husbands.  Lower educated men spend significantly more time on domestic tasks at weekend days 
than higher educated men do. Childcare time of fathers increases with own wage and with the 
presence of small children and this is true both for weekdays and weekends.  Childcare time of 
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mothers is not sensitive to wage incentives, but it increases with both the number of children and 
the presence of small children.  
 
The results suggest that the balance of time allocation of Italian spouses may become less unequal if 
the wages of women increased: the amount of house work performed by the husband would go up 
while that carried out by their wife would fall.  Market work of mothers would also increase. 
However, figures of female to male wage ratios (See Table A.1), not corrected for employment rate 
differentials, show that wage differentials between men and women in Italy are low, relatively to 
other countries, especially for prime-age women.  Therefore, the key policy issue may rather be to 
increase the provision of childcare services and the access to part-time work, which would lower the 
opportunity costs of market work for women.  
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Table 1  
 
Paid work, domestic work and leisure of Europeans 
Mean minutes per day – activity 
 
Paid work  
Men 
Domestic work 
Men 
Leisure time 
Men 
Paid work 
Women 
Domestic work 
Women 
Leisure time 
Women 
Belgium 187 148 358 113 250 306 
Bulgaria 212 157 286 154 301 227 
Estonia 267 153 302 185 293 258 
Finland 228 136 356 153 236 317 
France 228 144 284 137 274 245 
Germany 207 142 342 116 254 315 
Italy 255 95 305 112 320 246 
Latvia 300 110 285 209 236 248 
Lithuania 285 129 287 211 269 225 
Norway 244 141 352 158 227 340 
Poland 241 142 320 135 285 272 
Slovenia 233 158 331 162 296 267 
Spain 261 97 316 126 295 266 
Sweden 251 149 318 174 222 297 
United 
Kingdom 
250 138 322 144 255 295 
Source: Harmonized European Time Use survey (HETUS): persons aged 20-74 years. The years 
covered vary country by country. Domestic work includes childcare time and excludes traveling time. 
Paid work excludes travel time to work.  The Italian data are drawn from the same time use survey 
that we use for the analysis in this paper.  
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Table 2 
Sample descriptive statistics (week days) - Italian Time Use Survey (ITU), 2002-03 
(st. dev. in brackets) 
 Husbands Wives 
Age 41.5    (6.96) 37.9    (6.62) 
Primary education 0.08    (0.28) 0.08    (0.27) 
Intermediary education (excluded) 0.43    (0.49) 0.42    (0.49) 
Secondary education 0.51    (0.50) 0.51   (0.50) 
University degree 0.08    (0.27) 0.08    (0.26) 
Employed  0.96    (0.20) 0.48    (0.50) 
Potential work experience  25.13  (7.70) 21.54  (7.34) 
Hourly wage, Euros 7.59   (1.19) 6.55   (1.08) 
Paid work time (minutes) 422.4  (187.9) 145.7  (197.7) 
House work (minutes) 40.7    (60.6) 320.9  (151.0) 
Childcare time (minutes) 38.8    (60.0) 112.1  (114.6) 
Childcare time total, including secondary 
(minutes) 
49.6    (70.1) 139.9  (132.4) 
 Household characteristics 
Children Number  1.61    (0.68) 
Youngest child aged 0-2 0.22    (0.42) 
Youngest child aged 3-5 0.17    (0.38) 
North 0.40    (0.49) 
Regional unemployment rate  10.3    (7.27) 
N. obs. 1,049 
Note: See data section for more information on the variables in this table 
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Table 3  Sample descriptive statistics (weekend days) - Italian Time Use Survey (ITU), 2002-03 
(st. dev. in brackets) 
 Husbands Wives 
Age 41.6    (6.77) 38.1    (6.48) 
Primary education 0.09    (0.29) 0.07    (0.26) 
Intermediary education (excluded) 0.42    (0.49) 0.42    (0.49) 
Secondary education 0.51    (0.50) 0.51   (0.50) 
University degree 0.08    (0.27) 0.08    (0.26) 
Employed  0.96    (0.20) 0.48    (0.50) 
Potential work experience  25.24  (7.45) 21.63  (7.25) 
Hourly wage, Euros 7.61   (1.21) 6.60   (1.09) 
Paid work time (minutes) 122.5  (199.3) 37.7  (115.5) 
House work (minutes) 71.6    (87.1) 324.1  (158.2) 
Childcare time (minutes) 48.3    (77.6) 81.3  (100.7) 
Childcare time total, including secondary 
(minutes) 
63.5    (92.2) 106.9  (118.1) 
 Household characteristics 
Children Number  1.64    (0.67) 
Youngest child aged 0-2 0.21    (0.41) 
Youngest child aged 3-5 0.19    (0.39) 
North 0.40    (0.49) 
Regional unemployment rate  10.4    (7.34) 
N. obs. 1,784 
Note: See data section for more information on the variables in this table 
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Table 4  
Distribution of time allocation of husbands and wives (minutes) – 
Married couples, weekdays (N. obs. 1049) 
 PERCETILE 
 10% 25% MEDIAN 75% 90% 
 Wives 
Minutes of paid  work 0 0 0 340 470 
Minutes of domestic work 120 200 320 430 520 
Minutes with children as 
primary activity 0 10 80 180 280 
Minutes with children as 
primary AND secondary 
activity rate  
0 30 110 220 320 
 Husbands 
Minutes of paid  work 0 370 480 530 590 
Minutes of domestic work      0 0 10 60 120 
Minutes with children as 
primary activity 0 0 10 60 110 
Minutes with children as 
primary AND secondary 
activity  
0 0 20 75 130 
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Table 5  
Shares and distribution of shares of husbands time  on total couple’s time in the activity - 
Married couples, weekdays  (N. obs. 1049) 
 Share of husband’s 
time on total couple 
time in the activity 
Distribution of share of husband’s time on total 
couple time in the activity 
Percetile 
 Mean (St. err.) 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 
Minutes of paid  work 0.798    (0.008) 0.490 0.569 1 1 1 
Minutes of domestic work  0.119    (0.005) 0 0 0.044 0.185 0.364 
Minutes with children as 
primary activity 0.234    (0.009) 0 0 0.143 0.375 0.650 
Minutes with children as 
primary AND secondary 
activity  
0.242    (0.008) 0 0 0.178 0.381 0.625 
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Table 6  
  
Time allocation of couples by educational level (median values) – weekdays (obs. 1049) 
 Own time allocation Spouse’s time allocation 
  
 
Minutes of 
paid work 
 
Minutes of 
domestic 
work 
(large 
definition) 
 
Minutes of 
domestic 
work 
(narrow 
definition) 
 
Minutes 
with 
children as 
primary 
activity 
 
 
Minutes of 
paid work 
 
Minutes of 
domestic 
work 
(large 
definition) 
 
Minutes of 
domestic 
work 
(narrow 
definition) 
 
Minutes 
with 
children as 
primary 
activity 
Highly educated 
women 
245 215 205 115 470 35 30 20 
Middle educated 
women 
0 270 270 90 480 20 20 20 
Poorly educated 
women 
0 390 380 70 480 10 10 0 
         
Highly educated 
men 
455 30 20 10 250 255 250 100 
Middle educated 
men 
480 30 20 20 0 300 295 90 
Poorly educated 
men 
480 10 0 0 0 370 360 70 
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Table 7 
Results of estimation, week days 
 Husbands Wives 
 Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient  (St. Error) 
Paid work time     
Own wage 0.06 (0.50) 2.55** (1.13) 
Spouse wage 0.21 (0.15) 0.02 (0.25) 
Constant 5.13 (3.44) -16.50** (6.49) 
Age 0.02 (0.21) 0.07 (0.44) 
Age squared -0.07 (0.23) -0.22 (0.55) 
Primary education or less 0.27 (0.50) -2.46* (1.28) 
Secondary education 0.32 (0.57) -0.21 (1.11) 
University degree -0.10 (1.83) -3.60 (2.77) 
Number of children -0.03 (0.17) -0.65* (0.36) 
Youngest child 0-2 years 0.25 (0.37) -1.48** (0.71) 
Youngest child 3-5 years 0.21 (0.38) 0.00 (0.67) 
North 0.30 (0.25) 1.76** (0.50) 
House work time     
Own wage -0.07 (0.21) -1.04** (0.36) 
Spouse wage 0.15** (0.07) 0.01 (0.09) 
Constant -1.92 (1.68) 9.37** (2.30) 
Age 0.06 (0.10) 0.03 (0.15) 
Age squared -0.05 (0.11) 0.12 (0.19) 
Primary education or less -0.36 (0.27) -0.45 (0.48) 
Secondary education 0.34 (0.25) 0.12 (0.39) 
University degree 0.26 (0.81) 0.98 (0.96) 
Number of children -0.04 (0.08) 0.28** (0.13) 
Youngest child 0-2 years 0.14 (0.16) -0.43 (0.25) 
Youngest child 3-5 years 0.06 (0.17) -0.20 (0.26) 
North 0.25** (0.11) -0.89** (0.16) 
Childcare time     
Own wage 0.41* (0.24) -0.16 (0.25) 
Spouse wage 0.05 (0.07) 0.11 (0.07) 
Constant -4.32** (1.92) 0.76 (1.50) 
Age 0.08 (0.10) 0.04 (0.09) 
Age squared -0.18 (0.12) -0.15 (0.12) 
Primary education or less -0.42 (0.33) -0.03 (0.31) 
Secondary education -0.20 (0.28) 0.45 (0.28) 
University degree -1.11 (0.86) 1.22* (0.71) 
Number of children 0.12 (0.09) 0.41** (0.09) 
Youngest child 0-2 years 1.29** (0.16) 2.35** (0.18) 
Youngest child 3-5 years 0.92** (0.17) 1.25** (0.19) 
North 0.18 (0.12) 0.05 (0.13) 
The model is estimated for married couples excluding couples that answered the 
time diary on a weekend day.  
* = significance at the 10% statistical significance level;  
** = significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 8 
Results of estimation, week days, without wages 
 Husbands Wives 
 Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error) 
Paid work time     
Constant 5.65* (3,39) -12,12* (6,28) 
Age 0.07 (0,16) 0,47 (0,33) 
Age squared -0.11 (0,19) -0,47 (0,42) 
Primary ed. or less 0.13 (0,37) -4,41** (1,02) 
Secondary educ 0.47* (0,26) 2,38** (0,51) 
University degree 0.33 (0,53) 3,48** (0,96) 
Number of children -0.04 (0,17) -0,60* (0,36) 
Youngest child 0-2 years 0.24 (0,36) -1,56** (0,66) 
Youngest child 3-5 years 0.19 (0,38) -0,03 (0,67) 
North 0.31 (0,24) 1,60** (0,46) 
House work time     
Constant -1.68 (1,67) 7,73** (2,23) 
Age 0.06 (0,08) -0,13 (0,12) 
Age squared -0.06 (0,09) 0,22 (0,15) 
Primary ed. or less -0.40** (0,20) 0,35 (0,32) 
Secondary educ 0.36** (0,11) -0,97** (0,17) 
University degree 0.28 (0,22) -2,02** (0,29) 
Number of children -0.05 (0,08) 0,26** (0,13) 
Youngest child 0-2 years 0.14 (0,16) -0,40 (0,25) 
Youngest child 3-5 years 0.05 (0,17) -0,18 (0,26) 
North 0.25** (0,11) -0,82** (0,15) 
Childcare time     
Constant -3.46* (1,79) 0,81 (1,44) 
Age 0.17* (0,09) 0,04 (0,08) 
Age squared -0.24** (0,10) -0,15 (0,10) 
Primary ed. or less -0.69** (0,25) 0,06 (0,23) 
Secondary educ 0.23** (0,11) 0,33** (0,13) 
University degree 0.31 (0,20) 0,88** (0,21) 
Number of children 0.12 (0,09) 0,41** (0,09) 
Youngest child 0-2 years 1.27** (0,16) 2,34** (0,18) 
Youngest child 3-5 years 0.91** (0,17) 1,25** (0,19) 
North 0.16 (0,12) 0,06 (0,12) 
The model is estimated for married couples excluding couples that answered the 
time diary on a weekend day.  
* = significance at the 10% statistical significance level;  
** = significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 9 
Results of estimation, weekend days 
 Husbands Wives 
 Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient  (St. Error) 
Paid work time     
Own wage -1.21 (0.84) 1.86 (1.28) 
Spouse wage -0.31 (0.30) -0.61 (0.41) 
Constant 14.94** (7.46) -2.48 (11.5) 
Age -0.41 (0.43) -0.70 (0.66) 
Age squared 0.61 (0.49) 0.82 (0.78) 
Primary education or less -2.73** (0.92) -0.83 (1.95) 
Secondary education -0.13 (0.98) 0.18 (1.45) 
University degree 4.37 (3.01) -1.23 (4.03) 
Number of children 0.59* (0.35) -0.98 (0.63) 
Youngest child 0-2 years -0.70 (0.74) -3.07** (1.37) 
Youngest child 3-5 years -0.03 (0.67) -1.51 (1.10) 
North -2.10** (0.53) 1.49* (0.77) 
House work time     
Own wage 0.17 (0.18) 0.01 (0.22) 
Spouse wage 0.13** (0.06) -0.08 (0.07) 
Constant -2.05 (1.80) 6.63** (1.75) 
Age 0.01 (0.10) -0.11 (0.10) 
Age squared -0.02 (0.11) 0.20 (0.12) 
Primary education or less 0.50** (0.20) 0.43 (0.27) 
Secondary education 0.12 (0.22) -0.43 (0.26) 
University degree -0.28 (0.65) -1.11 (0.68) 
Number of children 0.04 (0.08) 0.57** (0.10) 
Youngest child 0-2 years 0.35** (0.17) -0.62** (0.21) 
Youngest child 3-5 years -0.03 (0.15) -0.44** (0.19) 
North 0.61** (0.10) -0.62** (0.13) 
Childcare time     
Own wage 0.38* (0.23) 0.11 (0.18) 
Spouse wage 0.11 (0.08) 0.01 (0.05) 
Constant -4.66** (1.90) -0.81 (1.29) 
Age 0.07 (0.10) 0.04 (0.08) 
Age squared -0.19* (0.11) -0.15 (0.09) 
Primary education or less -0.15 (0.27) -0.23 (0.25) 
Secondary education -0.02 (0.26) 0.13 (0.21) 
University degree -0.43 (0.84) 0.41 (0.53) 
Number of children 0.24** (0.09) 0.32** (0.07) 
Youngest child 0-2 years 1.70** (0.16) 2.52** (0.13) 
Youngest child 3-5 years 1.02** (0.16) 1.31** (0.13) 
North 0.36 (0.11) 0.10 (0.09) 
The model is estimated for married couples excluding couples that answered the 
time diary on a week day.  
* = significance at the 10% statistical significance level;  
** = significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 10 
Own and cross wage elasticity of time allocation (model of Table 7) 
 Husband wage elasticity (St. Err.) Wife wage elasticity (St. Err.) 
paid work husband 0.06 (0.56) 0.20 (0.15) 
paid work wife 0.03 (0.41) 3.78** (1.41) 
total in household 0.06 (0.44) 1.06** (0.41) 
     
housework husband -0.44 (1.31) 0.80** (0.36) 
housework wife 0.02 (0.12) -1.30** (0.48) 
total in household -0.04 (0.18) -1.06** (0.41) 
     
childtime husband 2.42* (1.41) 0.27 (0.36) 
childtime wife 0.35 (0.23) -0.44 (0.67) 
total in household 0.88** (0.40) -0.26 (0.52) 
 
32 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Country specific Gender wage ratios  and employment rates of mothers 
Selected OECD 
countries 
Gender Wage 
ratio,  cohort 30-
44, all education 
levels, 2004 
Gender Wage 
ratio,  cohort 30-
44, University 
degree, 2004  
Employment 
Rates, 2001, 
mothers of children < 6 
Employment Rates, 2005, 
mothers of children < 16,  
relative to OECD average 
(61.5%) 
Australia 62 64 45 = 
Belgium 75 77 66.2 - 
Canada 63 63 n.a. + 
Czech Republic 69 62 32.5 - 
Denmark 71 65 74.3 + 
Finland 71 66 n.a. + 
France 74 68 58.6 - 
Germany 57 61 52.8 - 
Hungary 87 67 32.9 - 
Ireland 63 61 n.a. - 
Italy 73 71 46.9 - 
Netherlands 62 n.a. 66.4 + 
Norway 66 65 n.a n.a 
Poland 81 66 n.a. - 
Spain 75 76 43.3 - 
Sweden 72 66 n.a. + 
United 
Kingdom 
57 64 55.5 - 
United States 63 60 61.2 + 
Source : Education at Glance, 2006 : the gender wage ratio is equal to the percentage of female annual earnings in 
male earnings, measured in 2004 or most recent available year.    
OECD 2002 Society at Glance, Social Indicators. OECD Labor Force Statistics and OECD Family Database.  For 
example, in Australia the maternal employment rate in 2005 is equal to the OECD average. 
n.a. stands for not available. 
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            Table A.2 
Descriptive statistics of samples used for wage predictions –  
Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) and Italian Time Use (ITU) 
(mean values, str. dev. in brackets)  
 SHIW ITU 
 Women 
Hourly Wages 7.62    (5.78) n.a. 
Children Number 1.43    (1.01) 1.43    (0.97) 
Youngest child aged 0-2 0.07    (0.25) 0.08    (0.27) 
Youngest child aged 3-5 0.06    (0.24) 0.07    (0.25) 
Youngest child aged 6-13 0.17    (0.37) 0.17    (0.37) 
Youngest child aged 14-18 0.13    (0.34) 0.13    (0.33) 
Youngest child aged >18 0.37    (0.48) 0.38   (0.48) 
Presence in the household of other adults older than 55 0.61    (0.24) 0.03    (0.17) 
Unemployment rate 9.83    (7.20) 9.57    (7.09) 
Primary education or less 0.18    (0.38) 0.14    (0.35) 
Intermediary education 0.33    (0.47) 0.32    (0.47) 
Lower secondary school 0.07    (0.25) 0.08    (0.27) 
Upper secondary 0.32    (0.47) 0.36    (0.48) 
University short degree 0.01    (0.10) 0.01    (0.11) 
University standard degree 0.09    (0.29) 0.08    (0.27) 
Potential work experience (age minus years of education) 24.70 (12.57) 22.58 (13.56) 
Married 0.69    (0.46) 0.62    (0.48) 
   N. obs. 4,853 (*) 14,481 
 Men 
Hourly Wages 7.99    (5.06) n.a. 
Children Number 1.51    (1.03) 1.42    (0.97) 
Youngest child aged 0-2 0.07    (0.25) 0.07    (0.26) 
Youngest child aged 3-5 0.06    (0.23) 0.62    (0.24) 
Youngest child aged 6-13 0.17    (0.37) 0.16    (0.37) 
Youngest child aged 14-18 0.13    (0.34) 0.13    (0.33) 
Youngest child aged >18 0.39    (0.49) 0.39    (0.49) 
Presence in the household of other adults older than 55 0.06    (0.23) 0.03    (0.18) 
Unemployment rate 9.92    (7.27) 9.33    (6.97) 
Primary education or less 0.11    (0.31) 0.11    (0.31) 
Intermediary education 0.37    (0.48) 0.36    (0.48) 
Lower secondary school 0.08    (0.28) 0.08    (0.28) 
Upper secondary 0.33    (0.47) 0.35    (0.48) 
University short degree 0. 01    (0.09) 0.01    (0.09) 
University standard degree 0.09    (0.28) 0.08    (0.27) 
Potential work experience (age minus years of education) 22.20 (12.06) 22.13 (13.3) 
Married 0.57   (0.49) 0.56    (0.50) 
   N. obs. 3,936 (*) 11,820 
Notice that the sample includes childless couples and couples with children of any age, as well 
as single people.  (*) Wages are observed only for 2,412 women and for 3,294 men. 
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      Table A.3 
Estimates of the wage equation and employment equation  
Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) 
 Men Women 
Wage equation Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error) 
Intercept 1.38** (0.03) 1.21** (0.05) 
Potential work experience 0.027** (0.002) 0.026** (0.002) 
Potential work experience squared/100 -0.034** (0.004) -0.031** (0.005) 
Intermediary education 0.09** (0.02) 0.14** (0.03) 
Lower secondary school 0.19** (0.02) 0.26** (0.04) 
Upper secondary 0.29** (0.02) 0.38** (0.03) 
University short degree 0.42** (0.05) 0.56** (0.06) 
University standard degree 0.60** (0.03) 0.67** (0.04) 
Standard deviation wage distribution 0.28** (0.00) 0.30** (0.00) 
     
Employment equation Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error) 
Intercept 0.12 (0.16) -0.10 (0.12) 
Potential work experience 0.10** (0.01) 0.09** (0.01) 
Potential work experience squared/100 -0.18** (0.02) -0.18** (0.02) 
Intermediary education 0.30** (0.10) 0.22** (0.07) 
Lower secondary school 0.55** (0.14) 0.79** (0.11) 
Upper secondary 0.65** (0.11) 0.91** (0.08) 
University short degree 1.19** (0.39) 1.04** (0.22) 
University standard degree 0.52** (0.14) 1.32** (0.11) 
Married 0.90** (0.10) -0.71** (0.06) 
Children Number -0.05 (0.04) -0.13** (0.03) 
Youngest child aged 0-2 0.13 (0.19) -0.14 (0.11) 
Youngest child aged 3-5 0.22 (0.20) -0.08 (0.12) 
Youngest child aged 6-13 0.07 (0.15) -0.08 (0.10) 
Youngest child aged 14-18 0.03 (0.14) 0.03 (0.10) 
Youngest child aged >18 -0.05 (0.11) -0.12 (0.08) 
Presence other adults older than 55 -0.13 (0.12) -0.13 (0.09) 
Unemployment rate -0.07 (0.00)** -0.06 (0.00)** 
ρ (correlation errors wage-employment) -0.39** (0.06) -0.12* (0.07) 
 
 
 
Table A.4 
Mean values of observed and predicted hourly wages  
in SHIW dataset (st. dev. in brackets) 
 Women Men 
Observed 7.62    (5.78) 7.99    (5.06) 
Predicted 7.25    (1.47) 7.69    (1.48) 
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Table A.5 
Covariance matrix errors for the model including only week days (Model Table 7 in the text): 
standard deviations on main diagonal, correlation coefficients off-diagonal 
 
Paid work 
husband 
House work 
husband 
Child time 
husband 
Paid work 
wife 
House work 
wife 
Child time 
wife 
Paid work husband 3.50**      
House work husband -0.41** 1.47**     
Child time husband -0.25** 0.20** 1.47**    
Paid work wife 0.13** 0.17** 0.08* 5.96**   
House work wife 0.06* -0.13** -0.09** -0.74** 2.32**  
Child time wife 0.10** -0.07* 0.26** -0.26** 0.05 1.70** 
 
 
Table A.6 
Covariance matrix errors for the model including only week days and excluding wages (Model Table 8 in the 
text): 
standard deviations on main diagonal, correlation coefficients off-diagonal 
 
Paid work 
husband 
House work 
husband 
Child time 
husband 
Paid work 
wife 
House work 
wife 
Child time 
wife 
Paid work husband 3.50**      
House work husband -0.40** 1.47**     
Child time husband -0.24** 0.20** 1.47**    
Paid work wife 0.13** 0.17** 0.08* 5.99**   
House work wife 0.06* -0.13** -0.09** -0.74** 2.33**  
Child time wife 0.10** -0.07* 0.26** -0.25** 0.05 1.70** 
 
Table A.7 
Covariance matrix errors for the model including only weekend days (Model Table 9 in the text): 
standard deviations on main diagonal, correlation coefficients off-diagonal 
 
 
Paid work 
husband 
House work 
husband 
Child time 
husband 
Paid work 
wife 
House work 
wife 
Child time 
wife 
Paid work husband 7.84**      
House work husband -0.29** 1.87**     
Child time husband -0.18** 0.17** 1.97**    
Paid work wife 0.31** 0.06 0.08* 8.92**   
House work wife 0.20** 0.18** 0.02 -0.35** 2.42**  
Child time wife 0.16** -0.01 0.31** -0.13** -0.01 1.68** 
 
 
